Akron Law Review
Volume 55
Issue 2 Intellectual Property Issue

Article 2

2022

Fair Use as a Market Facilitator
Miriam Marcowitz-Bitton
Dan Bombach

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will
be important as we plan further development of our repository.
Recommended Citation
Marcowitz-Bitton, Miriam and Bombach, Dan (2022) "Fair Use as a Market Facilitator," Akron Law
Review: Vol. 55: Iss. 2, Article 2.
Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol55/iss2/2
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at
IdeaExchange@UAkron, the institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of
IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please contact mjon@uakron.edu,
uapress@uakron.edu.

Marcowitz-Bitton and Bombach: Fair Use as a Market Facilitator

FAIR USE AS A MARKET FACILITATOR
Miriam Marcowitz-Bitton* & Dan Bombach**

I.
II.

Introduction ..................................................................317
The Fair Use Defense ....................................................319
A. The History of the Fair Use Defense in the United States
323
B. Evolution of Fair Use Defense Under Common Law in
the 20th Century .....................................................325
III. Authors Guild, Inc v. Google Inc. ..................................337
A. The First Proposed Settlement Agreement................338
B. Criticism of the Agreement .....................................340
C. Second Proposed Settlement Agreement ..................341
D. Summary Judgment.................................................343
1. The Purpose and Character of Use ......................343
2. The Nature of the Copyrighted Works ................344
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used ...344
4. The Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market or
Value of the Copyrighted Work ..........................344
E. Court of Appeals Holding........................................345
IV. Response to the Fair Use Holding in Google Books ........345
V.
Impact on the Market ....................................................348
VI. Fair Use as a Market Facilitator?....................................352
VII. Conclusion ....................................................................357
I. INTRODUCTION
A Pew Internet survey in 2016 showed that public attitudes toward a
library’s role in communities are largely positive. The research indicated
that the majority of Americans see themselves as lifelong learners who
like to gather as much information as they can when they face something
unfamiliar. 1 Although significant barriers to access remain, the open
Prof. Miriam Marcowitz-Bitton is an Associate Professor at Bar-Ilan University Faculty of Law.
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access movement and some search engine projects have made digital
publications more available than ever.
Naturally, most users seeking information on the Internet do not
begin with an academic search engine like Google Scholar or Google
Books. However, a Google algorithm may direct users to those kinds of
tools. Within academia, students and researchers rely heavily on academic
web search engines for research. 2 Given these trends, academic librarians
have a professional obligation to understand the role of academic search
engines as part of the research process. These engines provide access to
many copyrighted materials without the explicit permission of the
rightsholders.
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc. (Google Books) is considered a
watershed decision concerning the fair use doctrine. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that Google’s
purpose in copying copyrighted works is highly transformative and does
not adversely affect the markets for archiving copyrighted works. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that holding, 3 and the
U.S. Supreme court denied certiorari. 4
We believe that this holding played a significant role in facilitating
the creation of markets for archiving copyrighted works. This market
facilitation role is atypical of the fair use defense’s usual role and arguably
does not fully consider the effect that the use could have upon the potential
market for—or the value of—the copyrighted work. This article will
critically review the role of the fair use defense as a market facilitator,
examining whether it runs counter to the doctrine’s primary underlying
rationales of market failure and freedom of expression.
In Part II, the article explores the fair use doctrine, its legislative and
judicial history, and its underlying theories and contours. A deep
understanding of the doctrine’s principles will contribute to a better
understanding of the argument that this article advances. The purpose of
**
Dan Bombach is a third-year LL.B Candidate at Bar-Ilan University Faculty of Law.
We wish to thank the participants of the University of Akron IP Scholars Forum for excellent
comments: Sandra Aistars, Debora Halbert, Michael Madison, Emily Michiko Morris, Lateef Mtima,
Aaron Perzanowski, Mark Schultz and Mike Shuster. We also wish to thank Hillel Billauer for
excellent research assistance.
1. John B. Horrigan, Libraries 2016, P EW R ESEARCH C ENTER (Sept. 9, 2016),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2016/09/09/libraries-2016/ [https://perma.cc/4URV-A7LJ].
2. Simon Inger & Tracy Gardner, How Readers Discover Content in Scholarly Publications,
36 INFO. S ERVS. & USE 81 (2016).
3. Authors Guild, 804 F.3d 202.
4. Adam Liptak & Alexandra Alter, Challenge to Google Books Is Declined by Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/19/technology/google-bookscase.html [https://perma.cc/W2NV-7PEZ].
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the doctrine is to balance the owners’ exclusive rights, provided by
copyright law, with the public interest. Creating new markets for works
arguably harms the copyright owner and undermines the incentive system
created by copyright law.
In Part III, the article introduces the background of Google Books
and briefly presents the decisions of the various courts in the case.
Part IV presents scholarly responses to the decisions in Google
Books, suggesting that most legal scholars support the courts’ decisions.
In Part V, the article then reviews other projects modeled after the
Google Books project, suggesting that Google Books facilitated the
creation of a new market. This part shows how the Google Book’s
decisions gave legitimacy to similar projects, creating a new market for
archiving copyrighted works without the authors’ permission. We argue
that such market facilitation is not within the boundaries of the fair use
defense and should be reconsidered.
Finally, in Part VI, we suggest that courts consider the fair use factors
closely and give greater attention to the fourth factor, which deals with
the implications of the specific use on the author’s potential market.
II. THE FAIR USE DEFENSE
Intellectual property is considered a “public good” because it is
inexhaustible once produced and because it is disproportionately difficult
or expensive to prevent “free riders” from using it. 5 These characteristics
may impair the incentives to create and distribute new original works. To
overcome this market failure, legislators worldwide have enacted
intellectual property laws, including copyright protections that provide
authors with exclusive rights in their work, thus incentivizing the creation
and distribution of original works.
As the intellectual property clause of the Constitution states,
copyright protection aims to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.” 6 Starting in 1790, the U.S. Congress passed a series of copyright
bills to establish an incentive system for authors to create original works.

5. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 L. & C ONTEMP. P ROBS. Winter 2003, at 33; Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of
Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 S TAN. L. R EV. 455
(2010).
6. U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127–28
(1932); Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994).
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The ultimate goal of those bills was not the authors’ remuneration but
rather the advancement and dissemination of culture and knowledge. 7
Melville Nimmer has suggested another justification for the
monopoly granted to the copyright holder, which is rooted in the interest
of privacy: “An author may wish to create a work merely as an act of selfexpression, intending it for himself alone, or for only a selected and
limited group of others.” 8 Yet, the exclusivity guaranteed by copyright
also produces negative results in that it prevents others from expressing
themselves efficiently by using protected works. These results are in
tension with both the goals of copyright protection and the principle of
freedom of speech. 9 Moreover, as Landes and Posner explain, copyright
protection creates market distortion, 10 as an author’s right to exclusivity
produces anticompetitive effects such as monopoly pricing. As a result,
copyrights not only incentivize the creation of new works—they also
bring about economic distortions to markets. As Jeanne Fromer noted, “in
furtherance of its overarching utilitarian goals, copyright law excuses
some third-party uses that would otherwise be infringing by deeming them
to be fair use.” Fair use is therefore justified because it “can stimulate the
production of creative works for public consumption without undercutting
the value of the original copyrighted work too much.”11
7. Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966); Berlin v. E.C.
Publ’ns, 329 F.2d 541, 543–44 (2d Cir. 1964); Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the
Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. R EV. 1569, 1569 (1963); Jeanne C. Fromer,
Market Effects Bearing on Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. R EV. 615, 620–21 (2015); Ralph S. Brown,
Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. R EV. 579, 592–
96 (1985); Kyle Richard, Fair Use in the Information Age, 25 R ICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2018).
8. Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press, 17 UCLA L. R EV. 1180, 1187 (1970); see also William W. Fisher III,
Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. R EV. 1659, 1690, 92 (1988).
9. Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 152 (“The limited scope of the copyright
holder’s statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects
a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and
rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to
secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good. . . .When technological change has rendered
its literal ambiguous terms, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose.”).
The work of Rebecca MacKinnon has demonstrated how copyright law is connected to more
significant debates about free speech, digital rights, and internet freedom. See R EBECCA MACKINNON,
C ONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE S TRUGGLE FOR INTERNET F REEDOM (2013).
10. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL S TUD. 325 (1989).
11. Fromer, supra note 7, at 621; see also Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103
HARV. L. R EV. 1105, 1110 (1990) (suggesting that “[t]he doctrine of fair use limits the scope of the
copyright monopoly in furtherance of its utilitarian objective” and in order to enjoy the fair use
defense, “the use must be of a character that serves the copyright objective of stimulating productive
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The fair use doctrine addresses this inherent tension by allowing
limited, unauthorized use of copyrighted works under certain
circumstances. 12 It thus balances the public’s interest in creating and
distributing original works with copyright owners’ proprietary interest in
their work. 13 Notably, however, Landes and Posner emphasized that the
fair use doctrine should be interpreted narrowly. They argue that broad
application could both hinder the market incentive to reduce transactional
costs and yield scenarios in which users who are willing to pay for using
a work—a socially desirable outcome—are nevertheless exempt from
payment. Fair use should thus be applied only where the benefits of the
use are greater than the cost of copyright protection. 14
Wendy Gordon has stressed that it is not enough for the use to be
socially desirable to fall within the fair use defense. Fair use can serve as
an “economic justification for depriving a copyright owner of his market
entitlement [] only when the possibility of consensual bargain has broken
down in some way”—such as in the case of a market failure in general,
and high transaction costs in particular. 15 Another necessary and related
condition for applying the fair use defense is that “the use is more valuable
in the defendant’s hands or in the hands of the copyright owner.”16
Otherwise, we may undermine the free market and reduce incentives to
create new works. Gordon’s approach is similar to Landes and Posner’s
in that it suggests that fair use is aimed at preventing market failure.
Some have adopted a broader approach than Landes, Posner, and
Gordon, suggesting that fair use can “cast a wider net, trying somehow to
balance the value of the copyright interest against the social value of the

thought and public instruction without excessively diminishing the incentives for creativity.”);
Jeannine M. Marques, Fair Use in the 21st Century: Bill Graham and Blanch v. Koons, 22 B ERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 331, 334 (2007) (“At its core, fair use balances the inherent tension in copyright law
between establishing an economic incentive for new works and fueling the production of works that
build on these older creations.”).
12. Marques, supra note 14, at 357; see also Fisher, supra note 8; Marques, supra note 11.
13. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 479 (1984); see also Pamela
Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. R EV. 815 (2015). According to Samuelson,
the policies that underlie modern fair use include promoting freedom of speech and expression, the
ongoing progress of authorship, learning, access to information, truth-telling or truth-seeking,
competition, technological innovation, and privacy and autonomy interests of users.
14. Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 358.
15. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 C OLUM. L. R EV. 1600, 1615, 1627–35 (1982); see also Lydia
Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission
Systems, 5 J. INTELL. P ROP. L. 1, 48–56 (1997) (focusing on externalities).
16. Gordon, supra note 15.
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use.” 17 For example, Michael Madison argued that another justification
for the fair use defense focuses on enabling creating an environment that
facilitates expression, where applying copyright would stifle the creativity
it is meant to foster. 18 This purpose of fair use may be one place in
copyright where courts should find affirmative expression of the values
underlying the First Amendment. 19
Neil Netanel has also deviated from the economic analysis of
copyright and fair use. Netanel focused instead on the public interest in
free speech in the context of copyright and fair use, arguing that copyright
is a potential impediment to free expression no less than an engine of free
expression. 20 In Netanel’s view, copyright should be delimited primarily
by how it can truly serve as an “engine of free expression” and that
copyright scope, duration, and character should be shaped to best further
the First Amendment goals of robust debate and expressive diversity. 21
Melville Nimmer has addressed the tension between copyright and
freedom of speech, explaining that some areas demand limitations on
copyright in favor of freedom of speech, but such limitations must be
imposed cautiously so as not to undermine “the combined banners of the
first amendment and fair use.” 22 He argues that:
There can be no first amendment justification for the copying of
expression along with idea simply because the copier lacks either the
will or the time or energy to create his own independently evolved
expression. The first amendment . . . does not offer a governmental
subsidy for the speaker, and particularly a subsidy at the expense of
authors whose well-being is also a matter of public interest.23

Benjamin Damstedt has offered another rationale for the fair use
defense, which is grounded in the Lockean theory of property. He argues
that when a waste of proprietary rights takes place, the fair use defense is
justified. 24 Fair use thus serves as a kind of penalty on the copyright owner
who loses her exclusive right. 25 Damstedt’s approach, however, is not
punitive but rather utilitarian in nature. If the copyright owner does not
17. Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 C ARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 398 (2005).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, C OPYRIGHT’S P ARADOX (2008).
21. Id. at 10.
22. Nimmer, supra note 8, at 1200–01, 1203–04.
23. Id. at 1203.
24. Benjamin G. Damstedt, Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the Fair Use
Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J. 1179, 1194 (2003).
25. Id. at 1195–96, 1201.
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exploit her property rights, there is a waste of resources. Therefore, the
resource should be used by someone else, whose use can be facilitated
through the fair use defense. 26
William Fisher has identified a moral rationale for the fair use
defense. 27 He argues that authors and inventors deserve a reward for their
labor regardless of whether they would continue to create new works. He
posits that fair use acts as a counterbalance, ensuring the creator’s fair
return while also ensuring the “artistic creativity for the general public
good.” 28
Thanks to this balance, the fair use defense significantly contributes
to creating original works. As Edward Lee points out, the fair use defense
is also vital for the future of new technologies—such as social media,
cloud computing, and digitization. 29 Another example of the link between
innovation and fair use is in the Australian Productivity Commission’s
2016 report. The Commission recommended adopting the fair use
doctrine in place of the narrow set of “fair dealing” exceptions that
currently exist in Australia. The Commission concluded that the doctrine
of fair use would contribute to innovation, technological development,
and new ways of using content in socially beneficial ways. 30
A.

The History of the Fair Use Defense in the United States

Fair use originated primarily from the fair abridgment cases31
litigated in English courts during the 18th and 19th centuries. 32 The first
footsteps of the fair use doctrine in the United States were in the 1841 case
Folsum v. Marsh, in which Justice Story laid down the doctrine’s
foundations. 33 Fair use was eventually codified in Section 107 of the

use.

26. Damstedt’s approach could serve as a reason to allow the use of orphan works under fair

27. Fisher, supra note 8.
28. Id. at 1688–89.
29. Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. C AL. L. R EV. 797, 800 (2010).
30. Mike Palmedo, Australian Productivity Commission (APC) Recommends Adoption of Fair
Use to Restore Balance in Copyright Law, INFO. JUSTICE (May 2, 2016),
https://infojustice.org/archives/35959 [https://perma.cc/273Y-XND6].
31. The process of making a shortened version or abstract of a longer text.
32. See Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 B ROOK. L. R EV. 1371, 1373 (2011)
(presenting a broader and more detailed overview of the development of the doctrine of fair use in
England and its adoption in the United States).
33. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (holding that in deciding whether
the use of a copyrighted work in the development of a new work is a “justifiable use,” the court must
“look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used,
and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the
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United States Copyright Act of 1976. The doctrine directs courts to
consider four factors in making fair use determinations: (1) the purpose of
the challenged use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
that was taken from the copyrighted work; (4) and actual or potential
harms to the market for the work. 34
Despite the centrality of the fair use doctrine in judicial decisions, it
has been called “the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright.”35
To begin, the statutory list of factors is nonexhaustive. 36 Although courts
have developed additional criteria to consider when determining whether
a particular use is fair, no clear standard has emerged, resulting in great
uncertainty. 37 Furthermore, Congress recognized that even among courts
that have developed additional criteria, the factors they considered were
“in no case definitive or determinative” but rather “provide[d] some gauge
for balancing the equities.” 38
It is unclear how much weight a court should give to any one of the
four factors, whether additional factors should be considered, or whether
the analysis of any one of the factors is indispensable for a finding of fair
use. Although these factors implicitly direct courts to ponder both the
contribution to society and the possible impact on the author’s economic
interests from the use, the ambiguity of the fair use doctrine and its
statutory formulation bring about inconsistency and unpredictability in its
application.

objects, of the original work.”). However, the precise term “fair use” appeared only 28 years later in
Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
34. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
35. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939); Triangle Publ’ns, Inc.
v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980).
36. The 1976 Copyright Act states that in determining whether the use is “fair” the factors to
be considered shall include those listed in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). The Act provides that the term
“including” is “illustrative and not limitative.” Id. at § 101. The Fifth Circuit recognized the openended nature of the statute, but also indicated that “normally these four factors would govern the
analysis.” See Triangle Publ’ns, Inc., 626 F.2d at 1175 n.10.
37. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475–76. In Campbell v. Acuff–
Rose, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that this dynamic approach was a deliberate policy because
the application of fair use cannot “be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine
it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.” Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
577 (1994). However, Pamela Samuelson argues that despite the necessity of a case-by-case analysis,
fair use law is probably “more coherent and more predictable than many commentators have
perceived once one recognizes that fair use cases tend to fall into common patterns.” Pamela
Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 F ORDHAM L. R EV. 2537, 2542 (2009).
38. H.R. R EP. NO. 1476 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679. The Court
recognized that Section 107 requires a case-by-case analysis to determine if a use qualifies as a fair
use, taking into consideration the four statutory factors. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985).
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Congress’s failure to codify clear criteria for determining fair use
means that the doctrine has evolved primarily through judicial
interpretation. 39 Therefore, it is crucial to understand how courts have
construed and weighed the different factors bearing on fair use over the
last fifty years.
B.

Evolution of Fair Use Defense Under Common Law in the 20th
Century

The fourth factor, “the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work,” has traditionally been perceived as the
weightiest in the fair use analysis. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. KnightRidder Newspapers, Inc., 40 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 41
and Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises 42 are illustrative. In
these cases, the courts considered this factor the most important one and
the focus of their fair use analysis. 43 In Sony, the Supreme Court
highlighted the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
uses. 44 The Court held that when the nature of the use is commercial, the
use is presumed to be unfair. The dissent, however, offered an analysis
along the lines we propose in this article, concluding that:
Infringement [] would be found if the copyright owner demonstrates a
reasonable possibility that harm will result from the proposed use. When
the use is one that creates no benefit to the public at large, copyright
protection should not be denied on the basis that a new technology that
may result in harm has not yet done so. 45

The dissent emphasized that depriving copyright holders of the
ability to exploit a potential market and “to demand compensation from
39. Congress explicitly stated that the codification of fair use was intended to “‘restate the
present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way’ and intended that
courts continue the common-law tradition of fair use adjudication.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577
(quoting H.R. R EP. NO. 1476, supra note 41, at 66; S. R EP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1976), as reprinted in
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679).
40. Triangle Publications, 626 F.2d 1171.
41. Sony, 464 U.S. 417.
42. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539.
43. Triangle Publications, 626 F.2d at 1175; see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 602 (“the
effect on the market is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use”); Time Inc. v.
Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.
1992).
44. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449 (“If the Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or profitmaking purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. The contrary presumption [was]
appropriate . . . .”).
45. Id. at 482 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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(or to deny access to) any group who would otherwise be willing to pay
to see or hear the copyrighted work” constitutes a potential harm to the
market and tips the fourth factor against fair use. 46 The Supreme Court
ultimately concluded that the use in question was not infringing because
the plaintiff did not prove that it offered a substitute for the original work
and thus did not establish an adverse effect on its market value. 47 In
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprise, the Court similarly
held that the fourth factor is “undoubtedly the single most important
element of fair use.” 48
In its landmark decision, Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., the
Supreme Court reconsidered the weight given to each factor. The
Campbell Court accorded the most significant weight to the
transformative contributions of the challenged use, which is embodied in
the first factor of the fair use doctrine. 49 The Court defined a
transformative contribution as an addition to the original work with a
different purpose or character, changing the original expression, meaning,
or message. 50 Under this new approach, there are no “bright-line rules”
for determining fair use, and the four factors should be considered
together in light of the purposes of copyright protection. This reference to
the “purposes of copyright” marked a significant development in the
doctrine because it indicated the transfer of weight to the first factor of the
fair use analysis—the purpose of the use. The Supreme Court held that
the central purpose of the fair use doctrine is to allow transformative use. 51
As Justice Souter noted, transformative works “lie at the heart of the fair
use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of
copyright.” 52 Therefore, the Court held that “the more transformative the
new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.” 53 Indeed,
the Supreme Court recognized that there are situations in which even a
use that harms the original work’s market would be considered fair use. 54
46. Id. at 485.
47. Id. at 456 (majority opinion).
48. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
49. Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579, 591 (1994); Samuelson, supra
note 13, at 818; Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926 (2d Cir. 1994).
50. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 571.
51. Id. However, although transformative use serves as a premise to fair use, it is not a necessary
condition. See id. at 579 (“Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding
of fair use . . . .”).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 569.
54. Id. at 591–92 (“[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand for the
original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act.”).
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Although the Campbell Court considered the transformative nature
of the new work as evidence that it did not harm the market of the original
work, its perspective differs from that of the traditional approach to fair
use. The absence of harm was considered a common consequence—but
not a necessary condition—of the doctrine’s applicability. The Court held
that we must follow the purpose of copyright law, which is to enrich the
variety of expressions. Therefore, a transformative use that adversely
affects the original work’s market may still be considered fair. The
Court’s analysis signifies a departure from the traditional view, expressed,
for example, in Rogers v. Koons, where the Second Circuit held that “if
an infringement of copyrightable expression could be justified as fair use
solely on the basis of the infringer’s claim to a higher or different artistic
use—without insuring [sic] public awareness of the original work—there
would be no practicable boundary to the fair use defense.” 55 This approach
attaches great importance to public awareness out of concern that the
infringing work will diminish the original work’s market. Under this preCampbell approach, finding that a use is transformative does not
guarantee that it will be deemed fair use because the new use’s effect on
the market for the original must also be examined.
Campbell is also notable for its discussion of the difference between
transformative uses and derivative works. Section 106(2) of the Copyright
Act gives copyright owners an exclusive right to prepare derivative works
based on their original work. 56 As defined in the statute, a derivative work
takes a preexisting work and recasts, transforms, or adapts that work. 57
This transformation the statute contemplates is not the type of
transformative use the Supreme Court addressed in Campbell. The
transformative use at issue in Campbell requires not only a change in the
content of the work but also in the manner in which it is used. Prior to
Campbell, courts did not consider any use to be fair use if it included a
wholesale copy of the original work. 58 Post-Campbell, the use of prior
work for a new purpose—even a commercial purpose—may be
considered transformative and thus subject to the fair use defense. Courts
of appeals adopted this “transformative functionality” in later cases such
55. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
58. See Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO S T. L.J. 47, 55–56 (2012). A notable
exception to this was the Supreme Court’s decision in Sony, where the Court concluded that in-home
copying of free broadcast programming for time-shifting purposes was a fair use because it was noncommercial and merely allowed consumers to watch programs at a different time than they were
invited to view them without charge. Sony also dubbed any commercial use as
“presumptively . . . unfair.” See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).
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as Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 59 Blanch v. Koons, 60 Savage v.
Council on American-Islamic Relations, Inc., 61 and Bill Graham Archives
v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd. 62
For example, in Blanch v. Koons, the Second Circuit noted that when
assessing whether a particular use is fair, the most weight is placed on the
first factor, i.e., the transformative nature of the use and its commercial
nature. The court emphasized that the test for whether the use is
transformative is whether it “merely supersedes the objects of the original
creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message.” 63 Where a new work is substantially transformative, other
factors, including commercialism, are less significant. The court also
noted that under the fourth factor, “the market for potential derivative uses
includes only those that creators of original works would in general
develop or license others to develop.” 64
In addition, courts have also found a number of “non-expressive”
uses, which are highly relevant in the context of Google Books, to be
transformative, as illustrated in Perfect 10 v. Amazon 65 and Kelly v. Arriba
Soft Corp. 66 In Perfect 10, the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to
64F

65F

59. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that
substantial copying of a novel in the service of criticism was regarded as transformative use).
60. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that copying of a photograph to
create a new work of art (collage painting) was considered transformative use).
61. Savage v. Council on American-Islamic Rels., Inc., No. C 07-6076 SI, 2008 WL 2951281
(N.D. Cal. July 25, 2008) (holding that copying without modification could be considered
transformative after an Islamic organization copied and distributed anti-Islamic statements made by
American conservative far-right author Michael Savage as part of a fundraising campaign); see also
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[A]n individual
in rebutting a copyrighted work containing derogatory information about himself may copy such parts
of the work as are necessary to permit understandable comment.”).
62. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that
the use of full concert posters in a book in a scaled-down form changed the purpose of the use and
was therefore considered fair use).
63. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 246 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579
(1994)).
64. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
65. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
storing copyrighted images in a scaled-down manner by Google was considered “highly
transformative” because Google used those images not for their original expression purposes but to
create an index, and because of the significant “public benefit” of Google’s search engine).
66. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818–19 (9th Cir. 2003); see also A.V. ex rel.
Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 645 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding that automatic processing
of students’ work by software for the purpose of plagiarism-detection was considered fair use). For a
full discussion of the application of the fair use doctrine to automated and nonexpressive uses see
Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 NW . U. L. R EV. 1607, 1610–24, 1645–
56 (2009).
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prohibit Amazon and Google from displaying “thumbnails” of images to
which Perfect 10 owned the copyrights, which were published on thirdparty websites. Perfect 10 markets and sells its copyrighted images, and it
also licenses sales and distribution rights for reduced-size copyrighted
images for download and use on cell phones. In addition, it operates a
subscription service that allows paid subscribers to view exclusive images
that are not displayed in Google search results.
In analyzing whether the display of “thumbnails” amounted to fair
use, the court considered the first factor to be the most significant. 67 The
court emphasized the significance of the transformative nature of the work
and found that Google’s use was highly transformative because the search
engine transforms the image into a pointer that directs a user to a source
of information rather than a source of entertainment. In this way, the court
reasoned, the use provided a social benefit by incorporating an original
work into a new work—an electronic reference tool—that serves a
different function than the original work. 68 The court’s decision reflects
the Campbell principle that the more transformative the new work, the
less significant the remaining factors, such as commercialism, which may
weigh against a finding of fair use. Nevertheless, the Perfect 10 court
considered the fourth factor and concluded that because the use was
highly transformative, market harm cannot be presumed.
Similarly, in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., the plaintiff challenged the
internet search engine Arriba’s display of thumbnails of Kelly’s
copyrighted images in search results. 69 Considering whether Arriba’s use
was fair, the court noted that the more transformative the new work, the
less important the other factors, including commercialism. 70 Although
Arriba’s use was commercial, it did not use Kelly’s images directly to
promote its commercial uses. Similar to the court’s reasoning in Perfect
10, the Kelly court noted that while Kelly’s images served an artistic
purpose, Arriba’s use “functions as a tool to help index and improve
access to images.” 71 Arriba’s use had a different function than Kelly’s use
and did not merely reproduce the work on a different medium. 72
Regarding the fourth factor, the court noted that “[a] transformative work
is less likely to have an adverse impact on the market of the original than
a work that merely supersedes the copyrighted work” and ruled that
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1165–66.
Id. at 1165.
Kelly, 336 F.3d at 811.
Id. at 818.
Id.
Id.
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“Arriba’s use of Kelly’s images in its thumbnails are not a substitute for
the full-size images, which can be found only on Kelly’s page.” 73 It thus
concluded that the fourth factor also weighed in favor of fair use.
These decisions can be viewed as supporting Google’s position in
the Google Books case since Google’s use arguably offers a product that
is not a substitute for the original works but instead offers an archiving
service that serves a very different function than the original works.
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. stands in contrast to the
foregoing cases. 74 There, UMG sued MP3.com for archiving songs and
allowing users to stream them on demand. UMG argued that this use was
infringing and harmed the licensing markets. The court held that the use
was not fair use. Regarding the first factor, it found that the use was
commercial in nature and that copying a work to have it “retransmitted in
another medium [is] an insufficient basis for any legitimate claim of
transformation.” 75 With respect to the fourth factor, the court held that
“[a]ny allegedly positive impact of defendant’s activities on plaintiffs’
prior market in no way frees defendant to usurp a further market that
directly derives from reproduction of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted works.”76
Notably, the court viewed the right to enter a new potential market as a
part of the property right protected by copyright law, which includes “the
right, within broad limits, to curb the development of such a derivative
market by refusing to license a copyrighted work or by doing so only on
terms the copyright owner finds acceptable.” 77 The court concluded that
any infringement of this right qualifies as harm to the potential market for,
or to the value of, the copyrighted work, and thus tips the scale against
fair use. 78
In American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., the Second Circuit
again considered the fair use defense in circumstances similar to those in
Google Books. 79 AMG sued Texaco, claiming that the systematic
photocopying of copyrighted articles from a journal to which AMG
owned the copyright to avoid purchasing additional subscriptions was an
infringing use that harmed both the subscription market and the
photocopying licensing market. Considering the first factor in Texaco’s
fair use defense, the court found that although copying portions of an
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 821.
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Id. at 351.
Id. at 352.
Id.
Id.
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926 (2d Cir. 1994).
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article into a more practical or durable form could be transformative,
copying complete articles for the primary purpose of creating multiple
individual archives for Texaco workers was not transformative. 80 Under
the fourth factor, the court considered the impact on the value of
individual articles and held that, at best, there was only a minor impact on
the subscription market. 81 Nevertheless, because there was a potential
market for “photocopying licenses” that could be harmed by the use, the
use was infringing. 82 The court noted that the fourth factor was relevant
only if there was an impact on potential licensing revenues for traditional,
reasonable, or likely-to-be-developed markets, noting that “the right to
seek payment for a particular use tends to become legally cognizable
under the fourth fair use factor when the means for paying for such a use
is made easier.” 83
In these latter decisions, the courts considered archiving and the
possibility of entering a new potential market as within the property rights
protected by copyright law and held that such uses by others were
infringement rather than fair uses of the works.
Recently, however, in Google LLC. v. Oracle America, Inc., the
Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the scope of the fair use defense. 84
In that case, Oracle, the owner of a copyright in a computer program that
uses the popular Java programming language, challenged Google’s use of
Oracle’s code to create its Android operating system. The Court
considered whether Google’s use amounted to fair use under copyright
law. Evaluating the first factor, the court found that Google’s use of
Oracle’s code, combined with Google’s new and original code, reflected
“different kinds of capabilities” than the original code and concluded that
the first factor weighed in favor of fair use. 85 Regarding the fourth factor,
the court evaluated the amount of potentially lost revenue, the source of
the loss, and the likely public benefits of the copying. The Court held that
Oracle was unlikely to succeed in its competition with Google and that
the cause of the lost revenue was that users and programmers relied on
and were accustomed to Google’s product, not because of the copied code.
It held further that the public interest in the future creativity of new

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 922–923.
Id. at 927–929.
Id. at 931.
Id. at 930–31.
Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021).
Id. at 1202.
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programs would be harmed if the copyright were enforced. Accordingly,
the Court concluded that Google’s use was a fair use. 86
Google LLC. is especially notable for its dissenting opinion. The
dissent considered the first fair use factor as the second-most important
and characterized Google’s use of the code as derivative, not
transformative, noting that “[a] work that simply serves the same purpose
in a new context . . . is derivative, not transformative.” 87 The dissent noted
that the majority’s new definition of transformative—”a use that will help
others ‘create new products’ . . . eviscerates copyright.” 88 Additionally,
the dissent regarded the fourth factor as the single most important in
determining fair use and observed that by using Oracle’s copyrighted code
to develop and release Android, Google diminished Oracle’s potential
market in at least two ways: (1) by releasing Android for free, Google
“eliminated the reason manufacturers were willing to pay to install the
Java platform,” which was part of Oracle’s income; and (2) by harming
Oracle’s ability to enter into licensing agreements. 89 While the dissent
accorded significant weight to the impact on the market harm to Oracle,
the majority decision affirmatively allowed such harm, further developing
Google’s market.
David Nimmer has criticized applying the “transformative use”
doctrine in cases where the use of the new work did not change the
expression of the original copyrighted work. 90 Nimmer argues that the
term “transformativeness” has no content and is merely synonymous with
a finding of fair use for certain judges. Pamela Samuelson breaks down
“transformative uses” into three separate clusters: “transformative uses,
productive uses, and orthogonal uses.” 91 Samuelson defines
“transformative uses” as those that modify a preexisting work by creating
a new one, whether to criticize the preexisting work or simply as an
expression of artistic imagination. 92 She characterizes “productive uses”
as those that iteratively copy some or all of the preexisting work while
preparing a new work that is critical of the first. 93 Samuelson describes
86. Id. at 1208.
87. Id. at 1219 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1216.
90. DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON C OPYRIGHT § 13.05 (2011) (Nimmer argues that those
Second Circuit cases “appear to label a use ‘not transformative’ as a shorthand for ‘not fair,’ and
correlatively ‘transformative’ for ‘fair.’ Such a strategy empties the term of meaning—for the
‘transformative’ moniker to guide, rather than follow, the fair use analysis, it must amount to more
than a conclusory label.”).
91. Samuelson, supra note 37, at 2544. Samuelson’s proposal was not adopted by the courts.
92. Id. at 2548–55.
93. Id. at 2555–56.
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“orthogonal uses” as those that make iterative copies of the whole or
significant parts of a copyrighted work for a very different speech-related
purpose than the original, such as an activist organization’s distribution of
copies of an opponent’s work in its fundraising materials to highlight the
adversity the organization faces. 94 Samuelson suggests that courts should
not label “orthogonal uses” as “transformative uses” to create coherence
in copyright law. 95
It bears noting that in some fair use cases, courts have gone to great
lengths to define the copyright owner’s purpose and market in such a
limited way that there is no chance that the defendant’s use will harm it.
For example, in Perfect 10, the court declined to recognize a potential
market for downloading thumbnails, even though the plaintiff was
engaged in active efforts to exploit such a market. 96 An even more striking
example is Cariou v. Prince. 97 The defendant in Prince, a well-known
painter and photographer, used images from Cariou’s book without
authorization. The court found that Prince’s works would not affect
Cariou’s market because Prince sold his works to a specific audience—
”the wealthy and famous”—at high prices, while Cariou targeted the
general public. 98
Exploring trends pertaining to the first and fourth fair use factors in
case law, Barton Beebe conducted an empirical study on the fair use
defense in court decisions between 1978 and 2005 and found that the
fourth element has had the most significant impact, even more than the
transformative contribution of the use. 99 Beebe’s research shows that
despite the Court’s decision in Campbell, the importance of
transformativeness has been greatly exaggerated and that a significant
number of decisions do not rely on transformativeness. 100 The data reveals
that even after Campbell (and until 2005), “the fourth factor analysis
remains the most influential on the outcome of the overall test . . . . The
fourth factor essentially constitutes a metafactor under which courts
95F

96F

97F

94. Id. at 2557–59.
95. Id. at 2557.
96. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).
97. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). Like Google in Perfect 10, Prince justified
his work as fair use on the basis of “transformative purpose.” However, unlike Google, Prince did not
take Cariou’s entire photographs, but rather used significant portions them along with additional
material (to varying degrees in different works).
98. Id. at 709.
99. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156
U. P A. L. R EV. 549 (2008).
100. Id. at 605. That being said, in the cases that did find that a use is transformative, the court
almost always ruled in favor of a finding of fair use.
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integrate their analyses of the other three factors and, in doing so, arrive
at the outcome not simply of the fourth factor, but of the overall test.”101
Neil Netanel picked up where Beebe left off and provided an
empirical analysis of all fair use cases from 2006 until 2010. 102 Netanel
shows that after 2005, courts began to place more importance on the first
fair use factor and on the transformativeness of the use. His research
reveals an ongoing conflict between transformativeness and market effect,
in which courts disagree over which is the more significant factor. 103 Until
2005, the market effect was considered the most important factor. Netanel
shows that since 2005, however, the fair use doctrine has been
overwhelmingly dominated by the Leval-Campbell transformative use
doctrine. 104 Furthermore, and continuing with the pattern uncovered by
Beebe, there has been a very high correlation between a court finding a
transformative use and its eventual ruling that the use is fair. 105
Additionally, within the first factor, there has been a sharp decline in court
inquiries into the commercial nature of the use. 106 The data also
uncovered, alongside the rise of transformativeness, a simultaneous
decline in the significance of the fourth factor, partly because “courts find
that a use that is unequivocally transformative causes no market harm.”107
In conclusion, Netanel demonstrates that nowadays, the first factor is the
focal point of the fair use analysis, especially if the courts find the use
transformative. 108
In another empirical study, Sag analyzed over 280 fair use cases from
1978 to 2011 and showed that “transformative use by the defendant is a
robust predictor of a finding of fair use” and that “the contrast between
the significance of direct commercial use and the insignificance of
commercial use overall reinforces the dominance of transformative use
over other factors.” 109 Regarding the fourth factor, Sag shows that in
practice, it is not a factor at all, given the way courts apply it. 110
In a more recent investigation, Beebe continued his study and found
that contrary to Netanel’s primary findings, much has remained the same
101.
102.
(2011).
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 617.
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & C LARK L. R EV. 715
Id. at 734.
Id. at 736.
Id. at 740.
Id. at 742.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 745.
Sag, supra note 58, at 84.
Id. at 63–64.
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in the fair use case law after 2005. The first and fourth factors continued
to carry most of the weight in courts’ analyses, but the superiority of the
fourth factor over the first factor remained constant. 111 Beebe suggests
that the reason for the significant weight given to the fourth factor is that
“courts typically treat factor four as essentially a ‘metafactor’ in which
they integrate their analyses of the preceding three factors. In doing so,
they balance the justification for the defendant’s use of a work against its
effect on the plaintiff’s economic incentives to create and further exploit
that work.” 112
Beebe agrees that there has been an increase in courts’ interest in the
application of transformativeness and that it remains a dominant factor in
their analyses of the fair use defense. Yet this dominance does not stem
from the importance the court attaches to the factor itself. Rather, it results
from a robust correlation between transformativeness and the finding that
defendant’s use did not have a materially adverse effect on the potential
market for the original work—a consideration that is examined under the
fourth factor. 113 Beebe’s perspective is similar to the distinction we made
between the new line adopted by the Supreme Court in Campbell and the
traditional approach. Both Beebe and Netanel show that there has been an
increase in judicial interest in the transformative nature of the use.
However, they interpret this change differently. Beebe suggests that the
traditional approach still prevails and that courts continue to assign the
greatest weight to the fourth factor, with transformativeness a corollary
consideration. By contrast, Netanel argues that courts view
transformativeness as the primary consideration, and the more
transformative a use is, the less it will adversely affect the market for the
original work; separate consideration of the fourth factor is unnecessary.
Beebe’s study also found that within the first factor, which remains
a significant consideration bearing on fair use, transformativeness is still
heavily weighed compared to other sub-factors, such as the commercial
nature of the use. 114 Regarding the fourth factor, the study shows that,
111. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions Updated, 1978–
2019, 10 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. P ROP. & ENT. L. 1, 4, 33–36 (2020) (“Of the 169 core opinions that found
that factor four disfavored fair use from 1978 through 2019, all but three ultimately found no fair use,
and none of the three outlying opinions that found fair use offers particularly compelling analysis to
explain its divergence between factor four and the overall outcome. Meanwhile, of the 154 opinions
that found that factor four favored fair use, all but nine found fair use. A majority of these nine
outlying opinions ruled that factor four favored the defendant because there was no market for the
plaintiff’s work.”)..
112. Id. at 34.
113. Id. at 28.
114. Id. at 25.
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unlike Netanel’s conclusion, courts continue to apply the “Sony factor one
commerciality presumption.” 115
A recent empirical study by Asay, Sloan, and Sobczak, in which they
examined fair use cases between 1991 and 2017, found that there has been
a rise in the significance of transformativeness as a consideration in
assessing fair use. 116 Regarding the types of uses considered to be
transformative, the study concludes that “[o]verall, it remains difficult to
say what types of alterations or new uses courts are likely to deem
transformative.” 117 The study also found that “the fourth factor receives
less deference in how courts apply fair use,” which these scholars consider
a sensible and positive development, noting that the fourth factor “has
been notoriously difficult to apply.” 118
With respect to the types of uses discussed in Google Books, Pamela
Samuelson has examined how courts deal with access to informationpromoting uses such as those used by search engines. 119 She lists the
factors that courts have considered relevant in these cases: whether the
putative fair user facilitates better access to publicly available copyrighted
works; whether the information-access tool makes searches more efficient
and effective; whether copying is necessary or reasonable to facilitate
better access; whether transaction costs for seeking and obtaining
permission are such that a market cannot readily be formed; and whether
the information-access tool made by the defendant supersedes or
supplants the market for the copyright owner’s work. In Samuelson’s
view, when the alleged infringer’s information-access tool enhances the
market and value of the copyrighted work, this should be counted as a
positive factor for fair use. Samuelson also suggests that other factors
should be considered, such as whether the copyright owner made the work
available on open access sites on the Internet and declined an opportunity
to opt out of the information-access tool. These considerations bear on the
commerciality of the defendant’s purpose and, in her view, should be
given little weight since developing useful information-access tools is
sufficiently expensive that the defendant would most likely need to recoup
its expenses. 120

115. Id. at 30.
116. Clark D. Asay, Arielle Sloan, & Dean Sobczak, Is Transformative Use Eating the World?,
61 B.C. L. R EV. 905, 931 (2020).
117. Id. at 954.
118. Id. at 959.
119. Samuelson, supra note 37, at 2614–15.
120. Id. at 2615.
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Some scholars have argued that the fourth factor is the most
significant to fair use and should not be supplanted by transformativeness
because “in order to protect a copyright holder, the market for that
author’s product must be protected.” 121 These commentators have also
suggested that transformativeness should not be accorded the greatest
weight in a fair use analysis because of the inconsistency in its application,
arguing that the fourth factor is easier and simpler to apply, leading to
more consistent decisions. 122
Landes seems to justify transformativeness on an economic basis. He
suggests that courts should treat productive uses of a borrowed work more
favorably than reproductive uses, explaining that productive uses such as
parodies transform the original work into a new work and are unlikely to
substitute for the original work or reduce anticipated licensing revenues
in any substantial way. Reproductive uses, by contrast, are more likely to
substitute for the original work and, therefore, to have negative effects on
the incentives to create that work in the first instance. 123
In Google Books, which we discuss below, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit continued Campbell’s line of analysis and placed great
importance on the transformative contribution of the use. This line of
thinking is not entirely surprising in light of the decisions described above.
Still, the breadth of this decision and its potential impact on creators’
ability to control the uses of their works and get paid for them was
unprecedented.
III. AUTHORS GUILD, INC V. GOOGLE INC.
In 2004, Google Inc., which owns and operates the largest search
engine in the world, established a publicly available service called Google
Books Service (GBS) that allows users to search for books that Google
has scanned and stored in its digital database. The search offers a preview
(or “snippet view,” as opposed to a “full view”) of these books and, in
121. Ashten Kimbrough, Transformative Use vs. Market Impact: Why the Fourth Fair Use
Factor Should Not Be Supplanted by Transformative Use as the Most Important Element in a Fair
Use Analysis, 63 ALA. L. R EV. 625, 635, 640 (2012).
122. Tim Kingsbury, Copyright Paste: The Unfairness of Sticking to Transformative Use in the
Digital Age, 2018 U. ILL. L. R EV. 1471, 1498, 1500 (2018); see also Thomas F. Cotter,
Transformative Use and Cognizable Harm, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 701, 704, 726–27, 736
(2010) (arguing that market harm should be the more important factor of fair use, proposing a new
model of market harm under which “[t]he overarching question that courts should be asking in
resolving fair use disputes is whether the use at issue threatens the plaintiff with harm of the type the
copyright laws were intended to prevent”).
123. William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An Economic
Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. R EV. 1, 7–8 (2000).
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several countries, the option to buy the full-text book. 124 The books are
provided either by publishers, authors, or other right holders through the
Google Books Partner Program125 or by the library partners 126 through the
Library Project. 127
However, many of the scanned books were under copyright, and
Google did not obtain permission from the copyright holders for its use of
their copyrighted works. In September 2005, the Authors Guild, a writers’
advocacy group, initiated a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York, claiming copyright
infringement. 128 Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well
as damages. Google responded that its actions constituted “fair use,”
which is not considered infringement under the Copyright Act. 129
Before the court ruled on the issue, the parties reached a settlement,
which was later amended as explained below.
A. The First Proposed Settlement Agreement
In October 2008, the parties announced a settlement agreement. 130
Under this agreement, Google was authorized to continue to scan the
books into its database, sell subscriptions to an electronic book database,
sell online access to individual books, sell advertising on pages from
books, and make certain other prescribed uses. The terms of the agreement
also included a total payment by Google of 125 million dollars: 45 million
to the rightsholders whose copyrights had allegedly been infringed; 15.5
million for the publishers’ legal fees; 30 million to the authors’ lawyers;
and 34.5 million to create a Book Rights Registry, which is a form of a
copyright collective rights organization, to collect revenues from Google
and distribute them to rightsholders. The agreement further provided that
124. Partner Center Overview, GOOGLE P LAY B OOKS P ARTNER C ENTER HELP,
https://support.google.com/books/partner/answer/3244021 [https://perma.cc/JN4V-39EM].
125. An Introduction to the Google Books Partner Program, GOOGLE P LAY B OOKS P ARTNER
C ENTER HELP, https://support.google.com/books/partner/answer/3324395 [https://perma.cc/HZ9QDWMT].
126. This project includes the New York Public Library, the Library of Congress, and several
university libraries.
127. About the Library Project, GOOGLE P LAY B OOKS P ARTNER C ENTER HELP,
https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/9690276 [https://perma.cc/M4E9-B6JK].
128. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
129. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
130. .Miguel Helft & Motoko Rich, Google Settles Suit over Book-Scanning, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
28, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/29/technology/internet/29google.html [https://
perma.cc/9TRX-G8U5 ]; Authors, Publishers, and Google Reach Landmark Settlement, GOOGLE
P RESS C ENTER (Oct. 28, 2008), http://googlepress.blogspot.com/2008/10/authors-publishers-andgoogle-reach_28.html [https://perma.cc/HAF2-Z83B].
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Google would receive 37% of the revenue, while the authors and
publishers would split the remaining 63%. 131
Pursuant to the settlement, GBS would continue to search the
contents of books, but instead of returning “snippets,” it would display
content based on the book’s classification into one of three categories. 132
The first category is public domain books, which comprise an estimated
20% of the GBS collection, and which users would continue to be able to
view in their entirety. The second category is copyrighted books that are
commercially available (i.e., that are available for sale through customary
trade channels such as Amazon). GBS agreed to display only
bibliographic information and “front material” (copyright page, table of
contents, index, etc.) for this type of book, which accounts for about 10%
of the GBS collection. The third category is books that are under copyright
protection but are not commercially available. Around 70% of GBS books
are in this category. Per the settlement agreement, users could view up to
20% of a book’s text (with some restrictions). Rightsholders could,
however, choose to deviate from these default settings and individually
set the portions of their books available for users to view. 133
It was also agreed that institutions and individual users would have
the option of paying for permanent online access to the full content of
digitized books. The initial price of the institutional subscription would be
set concerning the price of products and services “comparable” to GBS
and would vary based on the type of institution (e.g., a corporation, a
library, or a government office) and the number of its members.
Further, there would be a separation between public and academic
libraries. Public libraries would be provided a single GBS terminal, which
would display the entire content of the Institutional Subscription Database
(ISD). This database would comprise all books that are copyright
protected but not commercially available. Academic libraries would be
allowed to have multiple terminals with such access, based on the number
of full-time students enrolled. Institutions could also purchase
131. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 671–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying
motion for final approval of amended settlement); Authors, Publishers Settle with Google over $125
Million Lawsuit, TECHC RUNCH (Oct. 28, 2008), https://techcrunch.com/2008/10/28/authors-andpublishers-associations-settle-with-google-over-125-million-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/RL4F-Z289];
Stephanie Condon, Google Reaches $125 Million Settlement with Authors, C NET (Oct. 28, 2008),
https://www.cnet.com/tech/tech-industry/google-reaches-125-million-settlement-with-authors/
[https://perma.cc/5FUH-XFRY]; Authors, Publishers, and Google Reach Landmark Settlement,
supra note 133.
132. Pamela Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyberspace, 94 MINN.
L. R EV. 1308, 1309 (2010).
133. T HE GOOGLE BOOK SEARCH SETTLEMENT, B ERKMAN KLEIN C ENTER (May 21, 2014),
https://cyber.harvard.edu/iif/The_Google_Book_Search_Settlement [https://perma.cc/J4FE-NWEC].
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subscriptions to the ISD. “Fully participating libraries” would receive
digital copies of any book scanned from their collection, including those
scanned from another library, provided that the library digitized a
sufficient portion of their collection. In essence, these terms would have
created a Book Rights Registry, enabling access to the GBS corpus
through public-library terminals.
The settlement agreement included opt-out provisions that authors
could invoke until September 4, 2009. It required the court’s approval
after a hearing to become final.
B. Criticism of the Agreement
The settlement agreement was heavily criticized. 134 Indeed, because
the impact of the settlement went beyond the U.S. and was relevant to
authors worldwide, it produced strong international objections. For
example, some European governments were critical of the agreement, and
many European newspapers voiced their concerns. 135
Siva Vaidhyanathan argued that the agreement granted excessive
power to Google and would pose a danger to the doctrine of fair use,
which would result in the doctrine’s judicial limitation. 136 He asserted that
GBS in its current form endangers the stability of the library system
because Congress was likely to see the Google and its academic partners’
excessive power as a threat requiring action, yet amending the Copyright
Act to limit their power could result in significant and unjustified
restrictions on copyright holders’ exclusive rights. 137 Ursula K. Le Guin
announced her resignation from the Authors Guild following the
settlement, claiming that the leadership of the Guild had “sold the authors”
and that the agreement threatened “the whole concept of copyright.” She

134. Google Settlement “Fundamentally Unfair to Writers,” AM. S OC’Y OF JOURNALISTS &
AUTHORS (Feb. 18, 2010), https://www.asja.org/who-we-are/media-releases/google-settlem en t fundamentally-unfair-to-writers/ [https://perma.cc/6HBG-636L]. For a summary of the objections
made by various entities see B RANDON B UTLER, THE GOOGLE B OOKS S ETTLEMENT: WHO IS F ILING
AND WHAT ARE THEY S AYING? (2009). For an overview of the debates concerning the settlement see
Sarah Glazer, Future of Books, 19 CQ R ESEARCHER 473 (2009).
135. Kevin J. O’Brien & Eric Pfanner, European Opposition Mounts Against Google’s Selling
Digitized Books, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/
24/technology/internet/24books.html [https://perma.cc/39MY-8UAU].
136. Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Googlization of Everything and the Future of Copyright, 40 U.C.
DAVIS L. R EV. 1207, 1207–08 (2007).
137. Id. at 1230.
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launched a petition against the settlement, which approximately 300
authors signed. 138
Harvard’s libraries also were not pleased with the settlement terms
and threatened to discontinue their partnership with Google unless the
arrangement was revised to include more “reasonable terms.” 139
C. Second Proposed Settlement Agreement
As a result of these criticisms, Google proposed an amended
settlement that would transform the snippet-view platform into an online
bookstore and subscription service. 140 Google negotiated this settlement
with representatives of both the Authors Guild and the Association of
American Publishers (AAP). The representatives of these entities
purported to act on behalf of all copyright holders with one or more books
that are or may become part of the GBS corpus.
The amended agreement included several significant changes. Books
published outside the United States were limited to those registered with
the U.S. Copyright Office or published in the UK, Canada, or Australia.
The agreement stipulated that the Books Rights Registry would include
board members from the UK, Canada, and Australia. 141 This condition
was intended to provide the rightsholders with flexibility and to improve
their position in renegotiating their terms. 142
In 2011, the district court reviewed the amended settlement
agreement according to the nine factors established in City of Detroit v.
Grinnell Corp. 143 These factors are used to determine whether a class

138. Alison Flood, Ursula Le Guin Leads Revolt Against Google Digital Book Settlement,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2010, 11:32 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/jan/22/ursula-leguin-revolt-google-digital [https://perma.cc/Q7BN-PPSP].
139. Laura G. Mirviss, Harvard-Google Online Book Deal at Risk, HARVARD C RIMSON (Oct.
30, 2008), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2008/10/30/harvard-google-online-book-deal-at-ri s k/
[https://perma.cc/4GWR-NLC4].
140. Pamela Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement as Copyright Reform, 2011 WIS. L. R EV.
479, 481 n.1 (2011); Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05 CV 8136,
2009 WL 3617732 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2008); Amended Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc.
v. Google, Inc., No. 05 CV 8136-DC, 2009 WL 3617732 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009).
141. Keach Hagey, Understanding the Google Publishing Settlement, NATIONAL (Mar. 16,
2010), https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/understanding-the-google-publishing-settlement 1.492378/ [https://perma.cc/5MCH-V7XF]; Jonathan Band, The Long and Winding Road to the
Google Books Settlement, 9 J. MARSHALL R EV. INTELL. P ROP. L. 227, 322 (2010).
142. Sherwin Siy, The New Google Book Settlement: First Impressions on Orphan Works, P UB.
KNOWLEDGE (Nov. 17, 2009, 4:16 PM), https://publicknowledge.org/the-new-google-booksettlement-first-impressions-on-orphan-works/ [https://perma.cc/XVZ5-CTEH].
143. Authors Guild, Inc v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
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settlement agreement is fair, reasonable, and appropriate. 144 If a court
concludes that the factors are satisfied, it will approve the settlement
without a hearing; alternatively, it may hold a hearing at which any
objections may be presented, and the court will determine whether to
approve or reject the settlement. 145
The court concluded that although most of the factors favored
approval, one factor—the reaction of the class to the proposed
settlement—weighed against approval. 146 The court observed that the
number of opponents of the agreement was considerable, that a significant
number of class members had opted out of the class action, and that the
concerns expressed were weighty. 147 The court went on to analyze the
objections to the settlement.
After denying objections to the adequacy of the class notice, 148 the
court considered the scope of relief and found it problematic. The transfer
of certain rights to Google released Google and others from liability for
certain future acts in exchange for sharing of future revenues. The court
emphasized that because the plaintiffs waived certain property rights in
their creations and not merely compensation, their silence should not be
deemed consent. To expropriate copyright interests, the court held, the
owner’s consent must be obtained. In that way approving this agreement
would exceed the scope of jurisdiction that the court may permit under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which relates to the
approval of class action settlement agreements. 149
Additionally, the court concluded that the named plaintiffs were not
adequate representatives of the class due to the conflicting or different
interests among members of such a heterogeneous group. 150
The court further observed a possible conflict between the settlement
and the Berne Convention and other trade agreements between countries.
While the Berne Convention has been adopted in the U.S. and applied to
144. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Circ. 1974)(listing the factors as: “(1 )
the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the
settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the risks of
establishing liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages; (6) the risks of maintaining a class action
through trial; (7) the ability of defendants to withstand greater judgment; (8) the range of
reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; and (9) the range of
reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the attendant risks of litigation.”) (internal citations
omitted).
145. Id at 462–63.
146. Authors Guild, Inc, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 675–76.
147. Id. at 676.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 676–77.
150. Id. at 679–80.
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books since 1989, the settlement would apply to copyrights registered in
Washington and books published in Canada, the United Kingdom, or
Australia on or before January 5, 2009. 151 Also, these provisions would
make it difficult for foreign authors to determine whether their works were
covered by the ASA or not. 152 Therefore, it is Congress’s role to regulate
these rights, not the court’s.
As a result, the court rejected the amended settlement, concluding
that it was not fair, adequate, or reasonable. 153
D. Summary Judgment
After the district court rejected the proposed settlement, the case
proceeded to summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment
in favor of Google. The court held that the fair use doctrine is best applied
only by providing sufficient protection to authors to stimulate creative
activity while also permitting others to utilize protected works to advance
the progress of the arts and sciences. The court went on to consider
whether GBS’s use of copyrighted materials amounted to fair use,
analyzing the four factors criteria, as detailed below.
1. The Purpose and Character of Use
The key question in evaluating this factor is whether the new work
is “transformative” in relation to the copyrighted work. The court held that
the goal of Google’s service was educational. The idea behind the
digitization of the books and GBS was to make the books much more
accessible to the public. Moreover, the service transforms expressive text
into a comprehensive word index that helps readers, scholars, researchers,
and others, providing them with data they would not get otherwise; as for
libraries, librarians and cite-checkers could use the service to locate books
more easily. 154
Therefore, the court concluded that Google’s use was “highly
transformative” and that such a finding strongly supported a fair use
finding.

151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 684.
Id.
Id. at 686.
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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2. The Nature of the Copyrighted Works
The second factor focuses on the nature of the copyrighted work—is
it factual or informational? Has it been published?
Restrictions on fictional works tend to be much tighter than those on
informational, non-fictional works. The rationale behind this distinction
is that facts, data, historical facts, and the like are in the public domain.155
In contrast, fictional works were necessarily created using the author’s
imagination and creative skills and, as such, deserve greater protection
under copyright law. As for whether the work has been published,
copyright law seeks to give the author of an unpublished work the
opportunity to publish it first. Consequently, the fair use doctrine is more
permissive of using published works than unpublished ones.
Most of the books in GBS are nonfiction and thus are not entitled to
strong copyright protection. Additionally, most of the books have been
published and are already available to the public. 156 The court found that
these considerations weighed in favor of a finding of fair use.
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
The third factor focuses on the extent of the parts of the original work
used by the alleged infringer. The larger the portion used from the original
work, the harder it is to invoke the fair use doctrine. This factor is explored
both quantitatively and qualitatively. Even in cases where only small
portions of the protected work are used, where those portions constitute
the heart of the original work, courts have tended to side with the
copyright owner and conclude that the fair use defense was not applicable.
The Google Books court held that although Google scanned the full
text of books and made verbatim copies, its use was highly transformative
because the service shows only a snippet view of the books. 157
4. The Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market or Value of
the Copyrighted Work
The fourth factor is the effect of the use of the work on the potential
market for the copyrighted work. This factor ensures that the use of

155. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 547 (1985); Bus. Trends
Analysts, Inc. v. Freedonia Grp., 887 F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 1989); Rosemont Enters. v. Random
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309 (2d Cir.1966); Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 506 F.
Supp. 554, 559 (D.D.C. 1981).
156. Authors Guild, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d at 292.
157. Id.
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copyrighted materials cannot be considered fair use if it adversely affects
the rightsholder’s ability to profit from his work.
The Google Books court held that GBS does not diminish the market
for the original work because the snippets cannot be connected coherently
and do not replace the original work. Furthermore, a reasonable factfinder
could find that GBS only enhances the sale of books to the benefit of
copyright holders. An essential factor in the success of an individual title
is whether it is discovered by potential readers. GBS allows authors’
works to become more easily discoverable to readers, much like
traditional in-store book displays.
After weighing these four factors together with other relevant
considerations and in light of the purposes of copyright law, the court
concluded that Google’s use amounted to fair use. The court emphasized
that GBS furthered the higher constitutional objective of promoting the
Progress of Science and the Useful Arts and, as such, should benefit from
the fair use defense. 158
E. Court of Appeals Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 159 The court held that the digital
copy providing a search function is a transformative use that makes the
books more widely available without providing a substitute for books
protected under copyright law. In particular, the court noted that the
licensing markets include very different functions than those that GBS
provides. Consequently, Google’s profit motivation does not justify the
denial of fair use.
IV. RESPONSE

TO THE FAIR USE HOLDING IN GOOGLE B OOKS

Scholars have praised the court for its “common-sense analysis in the
case.” 160 Matthew Sag called the decision “an important victory for
158. Id. at 293.
159. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 230 (2d Cir. 2015).
160. Anthony Prince, Authors Guild vs. Google: Understanding the Four Factors of Fair Use,
64 TENN. LIBR. 1 (2014); see also Angel Siegfiied Diaz, Fair Use & Mass Digitization: The Future
of Copy-Dependent Technologies after Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 28 B ERKELEY TECH. L.J. 683,
702, 713 (2013) (“The HathiTrust decision solidifies a growing judicial commitment to protecting
libraries and educational instructions in their efforts to make use of technology to increas e
preservation efforts, modernize their pedagogy, and facilitate better research. . . . The Google Books
project represents a product that was designed cognizant of incoming lawsuits, and its design is one
that sought to balance rights holder concerns by displaying no more than is necessary for user queries
and installing security measures that prevent the product from substituting the demand for copyrighted
content. This type of behavior must be encouraged, as the scope of transformative use must be
balanced by the incentive provided to authors by providing them with exclusive rights regardin g
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Google and the entire United States technology sector.” 161 Timothy B. Lee
commented that the “Google Books ruling is a huge victory for online
innovation.” 162 Corynne McSherry of the Electronic Frontier Foundation
stated that the ruling was a tremendous victory for fair use and the public
interest. 163 In her view, readers, authors, librarians, and future fair users
can celebrate. McSherry predicted that it would be futile for the Authors
Guild to continue the litigation: “Its membership might want to consider
whether they really want to spend more of their dues on this misguided
litigation.” James Grimmelmann suggested that “what seemed insanely
ambitious and this huge effort that seemed very dangerous in 2004 now
seems ordinary,” suggesting that “[t]echnology and media have moved on
so much that it’s just not a big deal.” 164
Pamela Samuelson noted the positive social impact of the decision
and called it a “substantial boon for authors, especially scholarly ones.”165
She argued that the use is transformative and not harmful to the market
for the original works (to the contrary, it even boosts sales), but it even
has a significant social impact. GBS enables new features that will provide
new tools for researchers that did not exist before, offering researchers
reproduction.”); Caitlin A. Buxton, Bridgemen Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corporation Revisited:
Authors Guild v. Hathitrust and the New Frontier of Fair Use, 11 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 77, 79, 88
(2015); Richard, supra note 7 (arguing that the Supreme Court should adopt a “broad view” of fair
use as determined in Google Books and HathiTrust); Annemarie Bridy, A Good Day at the
Googleplex, F REEDOM TO TINKER (Nov. 14, 2013), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2013/11/14/agood-day-at-the-googleplex/ [https://perma.cc/CE8B-5U7S].
161. Matthew Sag, Google Books Held to be Fair Use, MATTHEW S AG (Nov. 14, 2013),
https://matthewsag.com/googlebooks-decision-fair-use/ [https://perma.cc/P7PC-UMM8].
162. Timothy B. Lee, Google Books Ruling is a Huge Victory for Online Innovation, WASH.
P OST: THE S WITCH (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/
11/14/google-books-ruling-is-a-huge-victory-for-online-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/87NZ-4ZJG].
163. Corynne McSherry, Court Upholds Legality of Google Books: Tremendous Victory for Fair
Use and the Public Interest, ELEC. F RONTIER F OUND. (Nov.
14, 2013),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/court-upholds-legality-google-books-tremendous-victoryfair-use-and-public [https://perma.cc/Q8KP-YNW4]; Corynne McSherry, Big Win for Fair Use in
Google Books Lawsuit, ELEC. F RONTIER F OUND. (Oct. 16, 2015), https://tinyurl.com/3kz7wwja
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/10/big-win-fair-use-google-books-lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/Z6WH-XJ58].
164. Claire Cain Miller & Julie Bosman, Siding with Google, Judge Says Book Search Does Not
Infringe Copyright, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/
15/business/media/judge-sides-with-google-on-book-scanning-suit.html
[https://perma.cc/U3FEDXKW].
165. Pamela Samuelson, Google’s Court Victory is Good for Scholarly Authors. Here’s Why.,
C HRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.chronicle.com/article/googles-court-victory-i s good-for-scholarly-authors-heres-why [https://perma.cc/S4X3-KA85]; see also Peter Brantley,
Founder of Just-Launched Authors Alliance Talks to PW, P UBLISHER WKLY. (May 13, 2014),
https://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/publisher-news/article/62270founder-of-just-launched-authors-alliance-t alks-to-pw.html [https://perma.cc/697F-249T].
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and non-profit institutions greater access and digitization that is so
important to scholarly communities. Institutions involved in mass
digitization do not always have the financial capacity to handle such a
massive legal battle. In her view, any mass digitization venture would
have been considered fair use, but the inability to cope with potential
litigation jeopardizes these ventures. Fortunately, Google—an enormous
corporation with tremendous resources—took on this litigation and
prevailed. Doing so significantly reduced the risk of being sued and
enabled the continuation of these ventures. 166
Ariel Katz added that the purpose of fair dealing is to allow the
unauthorized use of works to promote the public interest for the
encouragement and distribution of works when doing so does not have a
seriously adverse effect on the rightsholders’ financial interests. The
court’s decision was proper, given its finding that GBS promotes
important public interest goals. 167
Nevertheless, some scholars have criticized the decision. Mangal
argues that even though the Second Circuit got it right:
In resolving the tension between the first and fourth factor in this case,
the benefit to the public clearly outweighs countervailing concerns . . . .
[O]ne is left with a lingering sense of injustice for the Authors Guild.
The writers are forced to take on the economic burden of serving the
public interest, even though they are not necessarily in the best place to
do so. The burden for the public good is placed on “the little guy.” This,
in turn, limits their resources and ability to produce even more creative
and scholarly works in the future, which undermines the ultimate goal
of copyright law.168

In addition, Mangal submits that the court wrongly applied the first and
fourth factors, arguing that the court broadly interpreted the
transformation in the first factor because the inherent nature and value of
the books are not being changed, but only their format. Even regarding
166. Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: Mass Digitization as Fair Use, 57 C OMMC. ACM
20, 22 (2014). In an earlier article, Samuelson opined that “[a]t first blush, Google’s fair-use defens e
for scanning millions of in-copyright books might seem implausible. Google’s purpose in scanning
these books can be viewed as commercial, which tends to weigh against fair use. Whole works were
being copied on a systematic basis, which also disfavors fair use…Moreover, digitizing books to serve
snippets might impede a new licensing market for rights holders.” Samuelson, supra note 143, at 487–
88.
167. See Ariel Katz, You’re in Good Company, Judge Chin, ARIEL KATZ ON INTELL. P ROP.
C OMPETITION & OTHER ISSUES (Nov. 14. 2013), https://arielkatz.org/archives/2986 [https://
perma.cc/FZ6W-7AJT];
168. Varsha Mangal, Is Fair Use Actually Fair? Analyzing Fair Use and the Potential for
Compulsory Licensing in Authors Guild v. Google, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 251, 272–73 (2016).
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the fourth factor, Mangal contends, “there was ‘strong competitive
landscape and immense commercial value’ for an online database of
copyright-protected books,” and that as a result of this decision, others
who potentially would have licensed and paid for the right to use a
copyrighted work can now do so without a license, “forever precluding
authors from realizing a new revenue stream while further entrenching
Google’s monopoly.” 169
In the main, however, the court’s fair use holding is widely perceived
as the right decision. No scholar has articulated concerns about the
possible effect of the decision on the market and whether the fair use
defense is the right scheme to achieve these goals. The following section
considers the effects of the decision on the market and questions whether
this market facilitating role is within the proper scope of the fair use
defense.
V. IMPACT ON THE MARKET
This part discusses the impact of Google Books on the markets for
archiving copyrighted works. The court effectively opened the market for
archiving copyrighted works through the fair use defense. Rather than
approving a settlement agreement that would have closed the market to
competition, the court opened the market not just for Google but also for
any archiving project that functions similarly to the way Google archives
books.
The following review suggests that Google Books fostered this
market facilitating role of the fair use defense. Following the court’s
ruling on fair use, new projects emerged that followed in the footsteps of
the GBS. For example, the HathiTrust Digital Library launched following
the case. This project is a not-for-profit collaboration of academic and
research libraries established in 2008 by the University of California
System, the Big Ten Academic Alliance (BTAA), 170 and the University
of Virginia. 171 The project’s budget is mainly held within the University
of Michigan budget system. 172 According to its website, the project
169. Id. at 271–72 (citing Brief for Appellants at 12, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d
202 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 12-4829).
170. Formerly the Committee on Institutional Cooperation (CIC). It is the academic consortium
of the universities in the Big Ten Conference. See History of the Big Ten Alliance, B IG ACAD. ALL.,
https://btaa.org/about/history [https://perma.cc/HR5K-T45W].
171. Our Membership, HATHI TRUST, https://www.hathitrust.org/partnership [https://perma.cc/
GV5C-XMFQ].
172. Governance, HATHI TRUST, https://www.hathitrust.org/governance [https://perma.cc/
NWJ9-DFCM].

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol55/iss2/2

32

Marcowitz-Bitton and Bombach: Fair Use as a Market Facilitator

2021]

F AIR USE AS A MARKET F ACILITATOR

349

contains more than 17 million digitized items. 173 Most of these items are
sourced from Google’s scanning. The rest were gathered from the Internet
Archive’s ongoing scanning work and local digitization efforts. 174
Scholars use this resource (through the HathiTrust Research Center) to
conduct computational analysis by looking for patterns in large amounts
of text. 175 Additionally, it could be used to read scanned books that might
otherwise be difficult, if not impossible, to find in accessible formats.
In September 2011, the Authors Guild filed suit against HathiTrust
in the Southern District of New York, alleging a massive copyright
violation. 176 The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On
cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that the
undisputed factual record established that HathiTrust’s uses—full-text
searching, access for persons with disabilities, and backup for
replacement purposes—established fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107. 177 The
court characterized all three uses as transformative, 178 ruling that
transformativeness was a requirement of fair use. 179 Therefore the court
ruled in favor of HathiTrust.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court
that the first two uses (full-text searching and access for disabled people)
were protected as fair use. 180 At the same time, the court identified
transformativeness as a quality to be assessed when weighing the first fair
use factor, 181 which considers the purpose and character of the use. 182 The
court agreed that “the creation of a full-text searchable database is a
quintessentially transformative use.” 183
Regarding the second use, however, the Second Circuit disagreed
with the district court’s conclusion that “the use of digital copies to
facilitate access for print-disabled persons is also transformative.” The
court noted that transformative use adds something new to the copyrighted
173. Welcome to HathiTrust!, HATHI TRUST, https://www.hathitrust.org/about [https://perma.cc/
5NR7-QLLA].
174. Jennifer Howard, What Happened to Google’s Effort to Scan Millions of University Library
Books?, EDS URGE (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.edsurge.com/news/2017-08-10-what-happened-togoogle-s-effort-to-scan-millions-of-university-library-books [https://perma.cc/H4D6-BJ42].
175. Id.
176. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
177. Id. at 459–64.
178. Id.
179. Aaron Schwabach, The Internet Archive’s National Emergency Library: Is There an
Emergency Fair Use Superpower?, 18 NW . J. TECH. & INTELL. P ROP. 187, 202 (2021).
180. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014).
181. Id. at 96.
182. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
183. Authors Guild, Inc., 755 F.3d at 97.
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work and does not merely supersede the purposes of the original creation.
HathiTrust, however, had simply expanded the accessibility of
copyrighted works; the underlying purpose of HathiTrust’s use was the
same as the author’s original purpose and was thus nontransformative. 184
Nevertheless, the court concluded that while not transformative, the aim
of facilitating access to the copyrighted works for print-disabled
audiences could be a valid purpose under the first factor of the fair use
defense. 185
The third use concerned the storage of digital copies of books to
preserve them for future generations. Stored copies were also copied by
libraries for the purpose of creating new ones if specific conditions set by
HathiTrust were met. The court concluded that the factual record
supported HathiTrust’s fair use defense as a matter of law and affirmed
the district court decision. 186
Echoes of Google Books reverberated in another project, the Internet
Archive’s National Emergency Library. The Covid-19 Pandemic had a
significant impact on copyright law. The most notable was the
establishment of the National Emergency Library, which offered
unlimited downloads of copyrighted works during the health crisis. 187 In
its announcement, the Internet Archive, which was the organization
behind this project, encouraged people to support the effort by sharing
books they owned to allow temporary access to them by others during the
crisis. 188
This project caused resentment on the part of many authors and
publishers. The threat to authors’ incomes and intellectual property rights,
and the unilateral nature of the announcement, provoked an immediate
response. 189
184. Id. at 101.
185. Id. at 101–02.
186. Id. at 103–04.
187. National Emergency Library, INTERNET ARCHIVE B LOGS, https://blog.archive.org/
national-emergency-library/ [https://perma.cc/E5UC-GNBY]; Chris Freeland, Announcing a
National Emergency Library to Provide Digitized Books to Students and the Public, INTERNET
ARCHIVE B LOGS (Mar. 24, 2020), http://blog.archive.org/2020/03/24/announcing-a-nationalemergency-library-to-provide-digitized-books-to-students-and -the-public/ [https://perma.cc/7MV93SWJ].
188. Freeland, supra note 190 (“We recognize that authors and publishers are going to be
impacted by this global pandemic as well. We encourage all readers who are in a position to buy
books to do so, ideally while also supporting your local bookstore. If they don’t have the book you
need, then Amazon or Better World Books may have copies in print or digital formats. We hope that
authors will support our effort to ensure temporary access to their work in this time of crisis.”).
189. Alexander Chee is an author and a Dartmouth professor who criticized this project. See
Alexander
Chee (@alexanderchee),
TWITTER (Mar.
27, 2020, 1:06 PM), ,
https://twitter.com/alexanderchee/status/1243585316105191425 קישור-שגיאה! ההפניה להיפר
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Four publishers filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of New York
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. 190 The statutory
damages sought in the complaint could have conceivably run into the
hundreds of millions of dollars, crushing the Internet Archive. 191
Alternatively, the publishers offered a gentler solution. The Internet
Archive would share with the publishers the profits, gains, advantages, or
the value of business opportunities it received from its alleged copyright
infringement. 192 The case was abandoned after the National Emergency
Library shut down in June 2020. Nevertheless, the project reflects an
initiative that proceeds in a direction similar to the Google Books project.
Yet another initiative, the Internet Archive’s Open Library project,
empowers libraries to lend digital books to users using Controlled Digital
Lending, which aimed to build a practice of controlled digital lending. 193
As of 2017, the program had 2.7 million scanned books, 319.5 million
books downloaded, and 272 partner libraries. 194
These examples reflect the tremendous impact that GBS has had on
the archiving market for books, including copyrighted works. The fair use
defense plays a major role in facilitating this market and in paving the way
for its expansion.
The discussion that follows will consider whether the fair use defense
should play such a market facilitating role and the extent to which it
undermines the economic potential of the authors of copyrighted works.

.“(אינה חוקיתthis is not freedom, this is piracy”); Alexander Chee (@alexanderchee),

TWITTER (Mar.
27, 2020, 1:04 PM), https://twitter.com/alexanderchee/status/1243584733369503746 (“As a
reminder, there is no author bailout, booksellers bailout, or publisher bailout. The Internet Archive’s
‘emergency’ copyrights grab endangers many already in terrible danger.”).
190. See Complaint at ¶¶ 51–52, Hachette Book Grp. v. Internet Archive (S.D.N.Y. June 1,
2020) (No 1:20-cv-04160); Timothy B. Lee, Lawsuit over Online Book Lending Could Bankrupt
Internet Archive, ARS TECHNICA (June 1, 2020 8:02 PM), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2020/06/publishers-sue-internet-archive-over-massive-digital-lending-prog ram/
[https://perma.cc/4UYP-T9VH].
191. Complaint, supra note 193, at ¶ 52. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) provides for damages of “not less
than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just,” while § 504(c)(2) provides that “where
. . . infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of
statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000.” Each individual download of an infringing
work may constitute a separate infringement. See, e.g., Capitol Recs., Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692
F.3d 899, 903 (8th Cir. 2012).
192. Complaint, supra note 193, at ¶ 52.
193. Learn More, OPEN LIBRS., http://openlibraries.online/learn/ [https://perma.cc/9K4HKU4F].
194. Open
Libraries
Home
Page,
OPEN
LIBRS.,
http://openlibraries.online/
[https://perma.cc/ZX5H-4LJ9].
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VI. FAIR USE AS A MARKET FACILITATOR?
In this part, we consider whether the fair use finding in Google Books
was appropriate in light of copyright theory and doctrine. We argue that
more careful consideration of the market facilitation role of the fair use
defense significantly undermines the purpose of the defense and should
be reexamined.
Digital technologies opened a new world of potential market uses for
authors. Copyright law should provide authors with incentives adapted to
this new age of opportunities. Allowing market players to shield such
major for-profit initiatives as GBS from copyright liability by invoking
the fair use defense facilitates a market for these projects and others,
lowering the costs of creating such products while depriving authors of
the opportunity to participate in the market or to license their copyrights.
This new market facilitating role is disputable also in light of the
centrality of the fourth fair use factor, which considers the effect of the
use on the potential economic market of the author.
One of the strongest arguments that Google raised in support of its
fair use argument in Google Books was that GBS was beneficial to authors
because it opened up new markets for them without offering substitutes
for their books. As discussed above, however, the court’s holding in the
case had a massive impact on the market that went beyond the case itself.
GBS has already inspired the creation of similar projects and is likely to
spawn more in the future. The fair use holding gave legitimacy to the
creation of a new market for archiving books and other types of texts. This
market also builds upon the use of copyrighted books that the public can
access without the rightsholder’s permission. Does this expansion of the
fair use defense to support the creation of a new market reflect the
understanding of the fair use defense?
The proposed settlements in Google Books would have had serious
anticompetitive effects on the market for works protected by copyright
because the settlement agreements provided Google with exclusivity. The
courts rejected the settlements due to these major competitive concerns.
Under the agreements, Google would have been the only market player in
the field. However, rather than allow the parties to amend the agreement
to respond to these competitive concerns and allow authors to profit from
their work, the court went in a different direction and allowed Google to
invoke the fair use defense, resulting in an opposite, pro-competitive
scenario that opened the market to competition by all and significantly
lowered market entry costs. We argue that traditional fair use principles
do not justify this extreme result.
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Traditionally, the fair use defense was supported by two major
rationales. First, the economic rationale that when there exists a market
failure because transactions costs for a particular use exceed the value of
the use for the user, the fair use defense offers a remedy by allowing the
use for free. This rationale was articulated in the seminal work by Wendy
Gordon. 195 The second rationale for the fair use defense is rooted in
freedom of speech principles and suggests that notwithstanding copyright
law, there must be some space in which the public should be able to use
works for free. This principle reasons that copyright law is not designed
to prohibit all use of protected works for the duration of copyrights.
Applying these rationales in the context of the Google Books project,
it is apparent that this was not an instance of a market failure. The parties
initially reached a settlement agreement that introduced anticompetitive
effects. However, they were able to reach an agreement under which
authors would have received revenue from their work. Considering the
second rationale, it is indisputable that the project facilitates free use of
works. However, it is unclear why this use should be free. There is no
doubt that the vision and scope of the Google Books project have
increased access to works of authorship and allowed greater opportunities
for authors to realize the economic potential of their works. Nevertheless,
the project is commercial in nature, and it is not clear that this new product
should be made available through a fair use defense rather than consensual
agreement. New economic opportunities for authors are at the heart of the
author’s economic rights. Incentivizing the creation of new copyrighted
works comes with the price of copyright protection. Google’s interest in
pushing the Google Book project to completion should not eclipse
authors’ interest in launching the very same market on their own or
profiting from the market through license agreements. In applying the fair
use doctrine, the court should have considered whether these interests
could be balanced consensually through licensing. It is unclear why the
court instead expanded the fair use defense to cover such major economic
markets, especially since the project would undoubtedly have been
launched even under a scheme in which Google paid each author joining
its project.
Even when considering previous major fair use holdings, courts
confronted with cases similar to Google Books have declined to authorize
the uses as fair use. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc. and UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. are illustrative, suggesting that
archiving works of authorship cannot be shielded by the fair use
195. Gordon, supra note 15, at 1614.
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defense. 196 One can argue that these decisions can be distinguished
because they involved the use of entire works, which was not the case in
the Google Books project, but even a snippet view is arguably a use of the
original work that includes no element of transformativeness. The
decisions in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. and Perfect 10 v. Google, however,
arguably support the court’s decision in Google Books, but we argue that
these two cases raise similar concerns to those raised regarding Google
Books. 197 The search engines in both cases used exact copies of the
protected works in a reduced size format. Using these works as an input
for the search engines without authorization arguably undermines the
potential market of the author. Recognizing the importance of search
engines, their use nevertheless should not be exempted from seeking
consent for using entire protected works, undermining the author’s
potential market.
Some scholars have criticized the decision on various grounds
similar to those we articulate in this article. Timothy Busse has argued
that the case was wrongly decided by overemphasizing the
transformativeness of the use, underemphasizing the commercial nature
of the use, and not properly considering the harm to creators and the public
interest. 198 He argues that applying fair use to mass digitization distorts
the doctrine, which was fashioned to carve out specific exceptions to
copyright’s exclusive rights to foster creativity and innovation, not as a
vehicle for fundamental shifts in the use of copyrighted works. Mass
digitization of books is thus beyond the scope of the fair use defense. 199
Busse suggested that a statutory framework be established to guide
commercial entities in facilitating mass digitization projects while
simultaneously compensating authors and providing the most benefit to
the public via widespread access to all digitized literature. 200
In a similar vein, Valente has argued that the court’s emphasis on the
first transformativeness factor was mistaken and ultimately jeopardized
the idea and objectives of copyright law and the fair use defense. Valente
posits that:

196. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926 (2d Cir. 1994); UMG Recordings,
Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)..
197. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818–19 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160–62 (9th Cir. 2007).
198. Timothy J. Busse, Crossing the Digital Rubicon: Google Books and the Dawn of an
Electronic Literature Revolution, 18 HOUS. B US. & TAX L.J. 119 (2018).
199. Id. at 142.
200. Id.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol55/iss2/2

38

Marcowitz-Bitton and Bombach: Fair Use as a Market Facilitator

2021]

F AIR USE AS A MARKET F ACILITATOR

355

if transformativeness continues to expand, copyright holders may lose
control over their works and how they are used in digital contexts where
a minimally different purpose is shown and where courts do not perceive
a significant impact on the market. They may not even be entitled to
receive a reasonable compensation for the uses,

resulting in decreasing “economic incentives to create new works and
harm the overarching goal of copyright law.” 201 Oberle has argued
similarly:
a major criticism of digital archives, and Google Books in particular, is
that its use of copyrighted texts is not truly transformative… the Google
Case judged transformativeness simply by asking if the expression of
the original work is being used for a different, socially-beneficial
purpose. This can create problems, as an emphasis on socially-beneficial
purpose may shift the focus of the analysis from the infringer’s actions
to the actions of third parties. This focus . . . could make fair use
protection easy to obtain.

He further emphasized that digital archives take away the right of
copyright holders to be the sole distributor of their works. 202
Rucki has also criticized Google Books, suggesting that the decision
disrespects authors’ needs, which in turn disrespects the needs of the
public. Like Busse, Rucki calls on Congress to regulate mass
digitization. 203 He emphasized that authors rely upon licensing revenues
to survive. From a public policy standpoint, the system for mass
digitization should allow authors to control the use of their works and
obtain compensation as an incentive to write, emphasizing that mass
digitizers tend to be large corporations or universities, whereas authors are
generally individuals with far more modest means. Accordingly, Rucki
observes that mass digitizers are better positioned to pay licensing fees.
Additionally, mass digitizers choose to participate in this industry,
whereas authors’ works are digitized without their prior consent. Rucki
argues that it is unfair to force the average author to yield potential
revenue streams to corporations and universities. 204 Rucki suggests three
solutions to mass digitization: direct licensing, voluntary licensing, and

201. Marie-Alexis Valente, Transformativeness in the Age of Mass Digitization, 90 S T. JOHN’S
L. R EV. 233, 262 (2016).
202. Bryan Oberle, The Online Archive: Fair Use and Digital Reproductions of Copyrighted
Works, 25 S. C AL. INTERDISC. L.J. 753, 763–64 (2016).
203. Timothy A. Rucki, Copyright Law—Unfair Use: Unionizing Content Creators through
Legislation to Solve the Problem of Mass Digitation, 40 W. NEW ENG. L. R EV. 85 (2018).
204. Id. at 106.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2022

39

Akron Law Review, Vol. 55 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 2

356

AKRON LAW R EVIEW

[55:317

extended collective licensing. 205 Vaidhyanathan has also argued against
the court’s holding, suggesting that a win for Google will cause the fair
use doctrine to become “increasingly less fair and less useful in real
life.” 206
Other scholars, however, have supported the decision, arguing that
licensing in Google Books was impossible and that the decision advances
authors’ economic interests. For example, Kwok agrees with the decision
and its application of the first and fourth fair use factors from an economic
perspective, suggesting that both Google and the authors stand to gain
from Google’s use but that the high transaction costs involved in
arranging a licensing agreement would have been prohibitive. 207 He also
suggests that we should consider the public benefit and the need to
incentivize expensive and risky innovation, arguing that Google’s use
facilitated educational and socially beneficial uses of copyrighted work
and that these should be welcomed through the fair use defense. 208 Hari,
too, has argued that the court’s analysis of the fourth factor was correct.
She emphasizes the decision’s beneficial effect on the writers’ market by
enhancing the ability of authors and publishers to become noticed. 209
Fromer has also observed that when assessing the fourth factor in the fair
use analysis, both market benefits and market harm must be considered.
Fromer praised the Google Books decision for considering the project’s
potential benefits for authors and not just the potential market harm. 210
While these arguments are superficially appealing, they are nevertheless
flawed in view of the significant market harm to authors, whose potential
revenues from the use are eviscerated and whose exclusive rights are
rendered meaningless when new markets for innovative products emerge.
Moreover, courts’ perspectives are based on the specific facts of
individual cases. As a result, courts are not well suited to determine how
best to regulate complex and challenging emerging new markets. The
creation of public goods has always involved tradeoffs and broad policy
decision-making. Therefore, if there is a desire to regulate new markets
for new products such as mass digitization, Congress is better suited to
the task.

205. Id. at 108–11.
206. Vaidhyanathan, supra note 139, at 1227.
207. Kelvin Hiu Fai Kwok, Google Book Search, Transformative Use, and Commercial
Intermediation: An Economic Perspective, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 283 (2015).
208. Id. at 315–17.
209. Priya Hari, Is Scanning Books Really Fair Use?: The Next Chapter in the Google Books
Litigation, 7 C HARLOTTE L. R EV. 111, 132 (2015).
210. Fromer, supra note 7, at 629–41.
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Finally, we suggest embracing Justice Blackmun’s approach in Sony,
where he expressed the view that the copyright owner needs to prove only
a potential harm to the market or to the value of a work to shift the burden
of proof to the defendant. 211 Congress has tacitly supported this approach,
having avoided the temptation of allowing unfettered use of works
without permission, even in the context of highly productive educational
uses. Moreover, although Justice Blackmun’s view dealt mainly with uses
that benefit the public at large, 212 we believe that the fair use doctrine must
carefully weigh the harm to the owner’s market against the benefits to the
public. 213
Given its historical underpinnings and rationales, the fair use defense
cannot play a market facilitating role. It was not designed to facilitate the
creation of markets for new products, and the way it was used in Google
Books undermines the copyright owner’s entry into a new potential
market. While the fair use doctrine allows productive and transformative
uses, it cannot do so by allowing a wide range of permissible uses without
remuneration to the author, especially when those uses pertain to all new
technological markets. Such an extension of the doctrine risks eroding the
basic economic rationale of copyright law by depriving authors of control
over their works and, consequently, their incentive to create. We believe
the court did not properly consider these implications in Authors Guild v.
Google.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have turned the spotlight on the phenomenon of
market facilitation through the doctrine of fair use. The purpose of the
doctrine is to supplement the rationale underlying copyright protection by
preventing market failures and balancing the power given to rightsholders,
on the one hand, with the free speech values and the public interest in
creating and distributing new works on the other. The fair use defense was
created to permit uses such as commentary, excerpt copying for classroom
use, and short quotations. Misuse of the doctrine could lead to unwanted
consequences. The court’s holding in Google Books has established a new
market for archiving and using copyrighted works. We argue against this
market facilitating role and propose following Justice Blackmun’s
approach in the Sony case, which shifts the burden of proving that the use
211. Id. at 480–81.
212. Id. at 482.
213. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417 484–85 (1984); Iowa State
Univ. Rsch Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).
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was fair to the defendant after the copyright holder establishes that the
defendant’s use could potentially adversely affect the market for, or the
value of, the original work. In particular, this proposition calls for the
adoption of the traditional approach, which granted greater weight to the
fourth fair use factor in examining the fairness of the use. We believe that
the adoption of our proposal will prevent the misuse of the fair use
doctrine and will be consistent with its underlying rationale by advancing
the interests of authors and society at large.
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